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Abstract
Suda, Matthew Thomas. MS. The University of Memphis. December/2014.
Applying a behavioral economic framework to the gambling behavior of college students.
Major Professor: Andrew Meyers, PhD.
Behavioral economic theory conceptualizes human behavior as the result of
allocating behavioral resources to engage in preferred activities. This framework has been
applied sparingly to gambling behavior. The present study sought to reveal the important
behavioral economic construct of relative reinforcing value for the activity of gambling
by manipulating the value of an alternative reinforcer as well as constraining it’s
availability in a sample of college students, a population that consistently shows elevated
rates of gambling as well as problematic gambling behaviors. Analyses did not support
the hypotheses, as gambling’s reinforcing value was not demonstrated by the
experimental manipulations. Implications and methodological limitations are discussed.
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Applying a Behavioral Economic Framework to the Gambling Behavior of College
Students
An extensive literature comprising animal and human subjects in experimental
and applied studies supports a behavioral economic model for alcohol and other drug use
behavior (Murphy, MacKillop, Vuchinich, & Tucker 2011; Vuchinich & Tucker, 1988).
A small yet expanding body of literature conceptualizes gambling behavior in a
behavioral economic framework (Madden, Francisco, Brewer, & Stein, 2011). Those
who adopt this approach assert that people place subjective values on reinforcers, and
choose to allocate behavioral resources to attain those reinforcers. Behavioral economics
is concerned with this valuation process and how people choose the behaviors they
engage in (Kahneman, 2003). This focus has proven valuable in the understanding of
addictive behavior (Murphy et al., 2011). Considering gambling within a behavioral
economic framework should help us to understand why people choose to gamble over
other lower risk activities and potentially inform prevention and intervention efforts
aimed at lowering reinforcement derived from gambling (Higgins, Heil, & Lussier,
2004). The purpose of the present study was to seek evidence supporting the utility of a
behavioral economic view of gambling behavior. Adapting an experimental design taken
from Vuchinich and Tucker (1983), we examined whether increasing the value of an
alternative reinforcer would decrease gambling’s reinforcing value, and if increasing the
constraints on an alternative reinforcer would increase the value of gambling.
Borrowing from the field of economics, behavioral economics views individuals
as consumers of behavior. In this sense, people choose to allocate time, money, and other
resources to a range of possible activities by engaging in a process of weighing the costs
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and benefits of the available alternatives. As the perceived costs begin to outweigh
perceived benefits, preference shifts. As the law of demand predicts, price increases lead
to a decrease in consumption or occurrence of a behavior. This decrease in consumption
is manifested in the shape of a decelerating curve (Murphy & MacKillop, 2006).
Behavioral economics also takes a molar view of behavior in that it does not attempt to
predict what choices people make in a specific context, but rather looks at the accrual of
behaviors over time. A behavior becomes preferred over a range of alternatives when the
behavior is perceived as having higher reinforcing value than the alternatives. This notion
of relative reinforcing value (Murphy & MacKillop, 2006) has been an important
construct in the addictions literature and has often been operationalized in laboratory
studies as the amount of work (e.g, lever presses) reinforcers elicited and the relative
amount of the substance consumed compared to the alternative (Higgins et al., 2004).
This relativity of reinforcing behavior is best explicated by Herrnstein’s Matching
Law (1970). Hernsteinn asserted that the occurrence of a certain behavior compared to its
alternatives is equal to the amount of reinforcement or reinforcing value derived from the
corresponding behavior and its alternatives. That is, directly relative rates of behavior
will match relative rates of reinforcement. In this way, behavioral output is a “zero-sum”
game; engaging in one behavior necessarily changes how much one can engage in all
other available behaviors.
In behavioral economic theory three key factors impact reinforcing value and the
prediction of behavior: 1) the availability of a reinforcer, 2) the availability of alternative
reinforcers, and 3) temporal delay to a reinforcer or its alternatives (Vuchinich & Tucker,
1988). Constraints on access to reinforcers influence their relative reinforcing value.
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Generally, when a reinforcer is directly constrained, the cost of obtaining it increases,
leading to a decrease in resources allocated to obtain it and a lower relative reinforcing
value. Alternatively, relieving the constraints on access to a reinforcer will drive up
relative reinforcing value because of the lowered cost of reinforcer obtainment. However,
individual differences temper this facet of reinforcing value. That is, demand can be
relatively elastic, and sensitive to escalating price, or relatively inelastic, and resistant to
escalating price. Additionally, when constraints are placed on alternative reinforcers,
resources will be less likely to be allocated to them (Vuchinich & Tucker, 1983).
Temporal delays to a reinforcer also impact relative reinforcement value.
Generally, as time to the reception of a reinforcer increases, subjective value of that
reinforcer decreases. This concept is also referred to as delay discounting (Bickel &
Marsh, 2001). A review of delay discounting and gambling studies consistently found
that gamblers, compared to controls, preferred smaller, more immediate rewards over
larger, later rewards (Madden et al., 2011).
Considerable evidence exists for the influence of alternative, nondrug reinforcers
on consumption of drugs. Higgins and colleagues (2004) extensively reviewed laboratory
studies with human participants that demonstrate the flexibility of the reinforcing effects
of cocaine, nicotine, and alcohol. Across substances, consumption has been shown to be
affected by constraints on their availability as well as the availability of alternatives.
Specifically, introducing a monetary alternative to cocaine reduced the amount of the
drug consumed by human participants (Higgins, Bickel, & Hughes, 1994). Additionally,
crack cocaine users given the opportunity to keep money or allocate it to acquire doses of
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the inhaled drug. As the amount of money increased, less was allocated to the drug
(Hatsukami, Thompson, Pentel, Flygare, & Carroll, 1994).
Vuchinich and Tucker (1983) demonstrated the amenability of alcohol use to a
behavioral economics model by offering participants the choice, on a button pressing
task, to select one of two potential reinforcers with differing temporal delays. On a
variable interval schedule participants were either given a choice to work for money in
increments of 2 cents or 10 cents or alcohol held constant at increments of 1/20th of a
drink. An additional manipulation of temporal delay to the monetary reinforcer was set at
immediate receipt of money, a 2-week delay, or an 8-week delay. With the proportion of
responses allocated to acquiring alcohol as the dependent variable, the investigators
found that as the monetary award increased, responding for alcohol decreased, and as
delay to receiving money increased, responding for alcohol increased. These findings
demonstrated the explicative value of behavioral economic theory with alcohol choice.
Given that gambling is risking money or something of value on an unknown
outcome, choice behavior and weighing risks are necessarily involved. It is ironic then
that gambling behavior has not been investigated in this theoretical framework to the
extent of other addictive behaviors. The extant literature focuses almost exclusively on
the behavioral economic concept of delay discounting (Madden et al., 2011).
Although a common recreational activity that is culturally acceptable (Whelan,
Steenbergh, & Meyers, 2007), gambling can be particularly problematic. Pathological
gambling is “persistent and recurrent maladaptive gambling behavior that disrupts
personal, family, or vocational pursuits” (American Psychiatric Association, 2000). Past
year gambling prevalence rates for college students range from 42% (LaBrie, Shaffer,
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LaPlante, & Wechsler, 2003) to 75% (Barnes, Welte, Hoffman, & Tidwell, 2010). A
sample more representative of the US population had a past year gambling prevalence
rate of 82% (Welte, Barnes, Wieczorek, & Tidwell, 2004). In a meta-analysis of
prevalence studies, Shaffer and Hall (2001) found lifetime pathological gambling rates of
3.4% for adolescents, 1.9% for adults, and 5.6% for college students. More recent metaanalyses suggest rates of pathological gambling in college students range from 3% to
32% with a median of 8.7%, a rate much higher than the adult population (Nowak &
Aloe, 2013). Among college students, 18.3% of men and 4.4% of women were found to
be problem or pathological gamblers (Engwall, Hunter, & Steinberg, 2004).
College student gamblers are at a high risk for developing other co-occurring
behavioral problems. Problem and pathological student gamblers compared to other
students reported binge eating and heavier drinking with more negative consequenes
(Engwall et al., 2004). Problem gambling among college students also correlates with
high-risk behaviors such as alcohol and other drug use and risky sexual behaviors.
(Stuldreher, Stuhldreher, & Forres, 2007).
Given the impact of problem gambling, especially among adolescents and young
adults, we adapted the Vuchinich and Tucker (1983) methodology to examine college
student gambling within the framework of behavioral economics. Based on prior work
with alcohol, we expected that preference for gambling would be influenced by the
reinforcement value and time delay of alternatives. We hypothesized that as the
reinforcing value of a gambling alternative increases, the reinforcing value for gambling
will decrease. Secondly, as the temporal delay to the alternative behavior increased, the
reinforcing value of gambling would increase.
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Methods
Participants
The sample was comprised of 84 participants recruited from a state university
undergraduate subject pool who were at least 18 years of age. Of the participants, 62%
were female and the average age was 22 years (SD = 6.4 years). Approximately 49% of
the sample was African American, 37% Caucasian, 7% Asian, 5% Hispanic, and 2% of
participants identified as “Other.” Participants’ selection of “Other” was not related to
gambling behavior.
Measures
Demographic Questionnaire. A brief demographics questionnaire was
administered to assess age, gender, and ethnicity. Other areas of assessment included
whether or not the participant found gambling to be an acceptable/permissible behavior,
and a measure of gambling activity preference (Dandurand, 1990).
South Oaks Gambling Screen (SOGS). This 20-item self-report questionnaire
assesses pathological gambling during the past year (Lesieur & Blume, 1987).
Participants who endorsed gambling behavior in the past year were invited to participate
in this study. Participants who scored 0 to 4 were classified as non-PG, and participants
who scored 5 or higher were classified as pathological gamblers. In other psychometric
studies with adult and treatment seeking samples, internal consistency was good to
excellent (α = .86-.97), test-retest reliability was adequate (r = .71), and convergent
validity was demonstrated with clinician-administered interviews (r = .86; Lesieur &
Blume, 1987).
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National Opinion Research Center Diagnosis Screen (NODS). The NODS
(Toce-Gerstein, Gestein, & Volberg, 2003) was developed utilizing the diagnostic criteria
for Pathological Gambling (American Psychiatric Association, 2000). Designed for
population-based surveys rather than clinical samples of problem gamblers, the NODS
was found to be sensitive for identifying pathological gambling in a general respondent
sample of individuals aged 18 years and older (Toce-Gerstein et al., 2003). A score of 0-2
indicates no gambling problems. A score of 3 to 4 indicates subclinical, or at-risk
pathological gambling. Five or greater equates to meeting diagnostic criteria for
pathological gambling. In a sample of treatment seeking problem gamblers, the NODS
had an internal reliability of alpha= 0.79 and to have a two to four week test-retest
reliability of 0.98. It detects problem gambling in 95% of individuals receiving treatment
for problem gambling (Toce-Gerstein, Gerstein & Volberg, 2003).
Delay Discounting Task – Short Form (DDT). The DDT (Amlung &
MacKillop, 2011) is a multi-item choice procedure contrasting hypothetical smaller
immediate monetary rewards and larger delayed monetary rewards. Preference was
measured over 66 items and yields an index of impulsivity, a parameter, k. This
parameter is part of a hyperbolic discounting function (Mazur, 1987): V = A / (1 + kD).
The DDT is considered an index of impulsive decision-making, separate but related to
two other broad categories of impulsivity measurements: personality-based indicies and
behavioral assays of response inhibition (de Wit, 2009; Perry, Larson, German, Madden,
& Carroll, 2005)
Gamblers Belief Questionnaire (GBQ). The GBQ (Steenbergh, Meyers, May, &
Whelan, 2002) is a self-report measure designed to assess gambling-related irrational
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beliefs. The GBQ consists of 21 gambling-related irrational belief statements for which
respondents are asked to rate the extent to which they agree or disagree on a 7-point
Likert-type scale. The GBQ score is the sum of all items. Scores can range from 20 to
140, with higher scores indicative of higher levels of gambling-related irrational thinking.
Both reliability and validity data supported our use of this instrument (Steenbergh et al.,
2002).
Measurement of Preference
Participants were randomly assigned to one of six conditions created by
manipulations in money amount (two levels) and temporal delay (three levels). The
dependent variable was proportion of responses allocated to gambling vs. money. Each
participant was given the task of responding on a simple button pressing task to earn
either individual spins on a slot machine to be used that day or two small amounts of
money. Money was available either in increments of 5 cents or 25 cents and the temporal
delay to receive the money was no delay, 2 weeks or 8 weeks. Due to the logistical and
ethical barriers of providing all participants with earned money and gambling
opportunities, deception was employed. Participants were compensated with snacks
provided after the experimental task and debriefing were complete.
The button pressing task was patterned after the task employed by Vuchinich and
Tucker (1983). Participants choose either money or gambling and then engaged in a
button-pressing task with points delivered on a variable interval (VI) 20-second schedule
of reinforcement. Points were accumulated for the selected reinforcer, either money or
gambling spins. All technical and visual aspects of Vuchinich and Tucker’s operant
console were replicated in software designed for this study but the participant performed
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on a laptop rather than a console. A counter and two labels appeared in each lateral half
of the upper third of the console. In the center of the screen is a black button labeled
‘Gambling/Money,’ and centered in the lower third of the screen is a red button labeled
‘Gambling,’ or ‘Money,’ depending on which counter was activated in the initial choice.
One counter registered points earned for spins on a slot machine and the other
counter registered points earned for money. Only one counter could be activated at a
time, with the label under the activated counter illuminated in green. The red button at the
bottom of the screen was labeled with the corresponding activated counter. Participants
earned points on the activated counter by clicking on the red button. At any time they
could switch to the alternative counter by clicking the black button. The label below each
counter explained the relationships: “When the bottom button says, ‘Gambling,’ (or
‘Money’) clicking on it will earn points on this counter for spins on a slot machine (or
money).” The label next to each counter specified the value of each point. The gambling
counter label, which was the same for all subjects read, “Each point on this counter is
worth a spin on the slot machine, which can result in wins up to $10, which you receive
today.” The money counter label was dependent on the participants’ treatment condition.
It read, “Each point on this counter is worth 5¢ (or 25¢), that you will receive today (or in
2 weeks, or in 8 weeks).” The present study used 5¢ and 25¢ increments to account for
inflation since Vuchinich and Tucker (1983) originally conducted their study.
Delivery of the points on either counter was on a VI 20-second schedule of
reinforcement. The label below the left counter is illuminated green at the start of the task
for all participants. Half of the participants had the gambling counter on the left, while

9

the other half had it on the right. The computer program kept track of the number of red
button presses on each counter and the number of switches between counters.
Procedure
Participants were shown slot machines in a room adjacent to the testing room. In
the testing room, they were consented and a basic assessment of current alcohol
intoxication, tobacco use, and medications was administered followed by questionnaires.
Following the consent and assessment processes, participants were seated in front of the
laptop with the experimental program (Appendix) and given task instructions.
Participants were told they would receive the earned money immediately after the
experimental session, in 2 weeks, or 8 weeks, dependent on the condition. The delay
conditions of 2 and 8 weeks were explained as a processing requirement of the university.
Participants were further instructed that “not every red button press will produce a point
on the counter,” but the true nature of the schedule of reinforcement was not divulged.
The program was demonstrated by the experimenter and the participants instructed to test
out the program in order to familiarize themselves with the procedure. Finally, they were
encouraged to press the red and black buttons as often as they wanted during the 20
minute session regardless of the choices they made during the task.
After completion of the experimental task, the experimenter debriefed the
participants, informing them of the unfortunate yet necessary deceptive nature of the
study. The importance of experimental integrity was emphasized and compensation was
awarded.
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Results
Gambling Behavior
Past year gambling as measured by the SOGS frequency table indicated 47
participants (56% of the sample) reported past year gambling. Of those participants, 34
(73%) were female. The average SOGS score for the sample was 1.06 (SD = 2.75). Six
participants (7%) scored ≥ 5 on the SOGS, indicating probable pathological gambling.
The average NODS score for the sample was less than one (M = 0.94, SD = 2.38). Five
participants (6%) met DSM-IV criteria for pathological gambling, as measured by ≥ 5 on
the NODS. Two participants (3%) were classified as subclinical pathological gamblers
(NODS score = 3 – 4).
Preliminary Analyses
ANOVAs revealed no significant differences between proportion of presses for
gambling as a function of past year gambling severity. SOGS-classified non-gamblers
and non-pathological gamblers (M = .37, SD = .27) did not differ from probable
pathological gamblers (M = .54, SD = .33), F(1,79) = 1.85, p = .178, and NODSclassified pathological gamblers (M = .50, SD = .41) did not differ from at-risk gamblers
(M = .37, SD = .16) or non-gamblers (M = .38, SD = .27), F(2,78) = .45, p = .639.
Participants that reported having gambled in a casino (M = .41, SD = .28) did not
have a significantly different proportion of presses for gambling compared to those who
either had not gambled in a casino or did not gamble (M = .36, SD = .28), t (82) = .59, p =
.56.
Demographic variables’ relations to the proportion of presses for gambling were
also assessed. Age did not correlate significantly with proportion of presses for gambling
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(r = .02, p = .87), nor was there a correspondence with ethnicity, F(4,80) = 1.96, p = .127.
Additionally, measures of past-year gambling severity and a measure of gambling-related
cognitive distortions did not correlate significantly with the proportion of presses for
gambling (SOGS, r = .11, p = .32; NODS, r = .02, p = .83; GBQ, r = .12, p = .26). The
SOGS and NODS correlated significantly (r = .42, p < .01), with SOGS scores also being
significantly related to the impulsivity index scores yielded by the Delay Discounting
Task (DDT) (r = .30, p = .01). DDT impulsivity index scores were not significantly
related to the proportion of presses for gambling (r = .02, p = .88).
Preference Analysis
In order to test main hypotheses of the reinforcing value of gambling changing
due to manipulations of the relative value of alternatives and temporal delay,
respectively, a 2 x 3 (Money x Delay) ANOVA was conducted, with proportion of button
presses for gambling as the dependent variable.
The main effect for delay was not statistically significant, F(2,84) = .317 , p =
.73, and the main effect for money’s relative value was also not statistically significant
F(1,84) = .565, p = .46 (see Table 1). The interaction effect of the alternative’s relative
value and delay was not statistically significant, F(2,84) = 0.494 , p = .61 (see Table 1).
Effect sizes for the interaction, delay, and alternative’s relative value were .013, .008, and
.007, respectively – indicating small effect sizes (Cohen, 1988).
Because the dependent variable comprised proportions of responses, data was not
normally distributed, but rather occurred over a large proportion of the percentage scale.
An arcsine transformation was performed on the data prior to a follow-up analysis of
variance (Bartlett, 1936). The main effect for delay was not statistically significant,
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F(2,84) = 0.255, p = .78, and the main effect for the alternative’s relative value was also
not statistically significant F(1,84) = 0.268, p = .61. The interaction effect of the
alternative’s relative value and delay was not statistically significant, F(2,84) = 0.433, p
= .65. (See Table 2). Effect sizes for the interaction, delay, and alternative’s relative
value were .011, .006, and .003, respectively – indicating small effect sizes (Cohen,
1988).
Additional analyses were conducted on the groups by manipulation. An
independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare proportion of presses for gambling
for 5 cents (M = .41, SD = .30) and 25 cents (M = .36, SD = .25; t (82) = .763, p = .45,
two-tailed) conditions. There was no significant difference in scores for 5 cents and 25
cents. A one-way between-groups analysis of variance was conducted to explore the
impact of delay on proportion of presses for gambling. There was no statistical difference
for the three groups: F (2, 82) = .323, p = .73.
Discussion
The present study sought to demonstrate the behavioral economic properties of
gambling in a sample of college students. Several experimental conditions were created
by manipulating the relative value of an alternative reinforcer through changing value and
temporal delay. The hypothesized differences between groups were not supported by the
data. Participants did not prefer gambling to a monetary alternative even when that value
increased from 5cents to 25cents nor did they amend their preference as the time to
delivery of money increased, thus supporting the null hypothesis.
Given the extant literature on the behavioral economics of gambling, support for
the null hypothesis is surprising. Though no published studies have sought to elicit the
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relative reinforcing value of gambling, evidence of its existence was shown in a recent
meta-analysis that found pathological gamblers to consistently discount delayed rewards
in similar ways to clinical populations with various addictive diagnoses (MacKillop et al.
2011). Also unexpected were the nonsignificant relationships between proportion of
presses for gambling and gambling behavior, a behavioral economic index of impulsivity,
and a measure of gambling-related cognitive distortions.
These data are inconsistent with previous work on gambling and behavioral
economics, and are inconsistent with the Vuchinich and Tucker (1983) study on the
behavioral economics of alcohol. Increasing the value of an alternative to gambling did
not decrease the value of gambling. The present findings can be interpreted one of two
ways. First, the results may be an anomalous artifact of the extant literature due to
methodological issues and/or sample characteristics. The second interpretation holds that
gambling is not subject to behavioral economic principles in the ways demonstrated by
other addictive behaviors.
Taken in the context of the first interpretation, the study’s results question our
investigation of gambling and its relation to behavioral economic constructs. In the
present study, the reinforcing facets of gambling may not have been represented by spins
on a slot machine. Instead, asking participants to press a button to accrue either small
amounts of money to be used for gambling or small amounts of money to be received
may be a better operationalization of preference for gambling. Additionally, the small
amounts of money used as the alternative reinforcer may have rendered the delay to
receiving the hypothetical amount inconsequential. Also contributing to this
interpretation are sample characteristics. MacKillop et al.’s 2011 meta-analysis of delay
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reward discounting across addictive diagnoses included ten studies of gambling behavior.
Nine of those studies compared clinical samples to healthy controls, with all finding
pathological gamblers discounting delayed rewards more steeply than the controls. Not
only was the sample non-clinical, but the college student participants gambled at a much
lower rate than has been reported for the population (Nowak & Aloe, 2013). Finally,
while participants in this study had an average age above 21, some participants may not
have had the opportunity to gamble in establishments with slot machines, potentially
reducing the reinforcing value of gambling.
A second interpretation of the results is that gambling behavior differs from other
addictive behaviors by not complying with behavioral economic principles. This
possibility suggests that gambling’s reinforcing value is not affected by a monetary
alternative changing in value, nor by its temporal delay. Such an interpretation is not
convergent with the gambling literature which reveals that gamblers hold these valuations
(Madden et al., 2011). Additionally, impulsivity as measured by delay discounting is a
hallmark of addictive behavior (de Wit, 2009). Given the state of our understanding of
gambling behavior and behavioral economics, study design and operationalizing the
target behavior are more likely responsible for these findings than an underlying
discrepancy between gambling behavior and behavioral economics.
Limitations of the study include a lack of a manipulation check performed after
participants completed the experimental task, leaving open the possibility that
experimental groups did not perceive meaningful differences in their conditions.
Additionally, the low gambling problem severity of the sample and the relatively high
number of females’ gambling limits generalizations to more general populations. The
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study may also have been affected by an insufficient number of participants to detect a
true difference between groups. A power analysis performed before data collection
revealed a sample size of 82 to be necessary to detect a moderate effect size, though with
the present design, additional participants may be necessary for that benchmark. Finally,
the increments of 5 and 25 used may have been too small for participants to perceive as a
reinforcing alternative to gambling.
A challenge to conducting behavioral economic research on gambling lies in the
framework of the empirical literature of other addictive substances. The long history of
psychological experimentation on addictive behaviors allowed investigators to model
methods and apparatuses after those used with animals that labored for drug
administrations and benign alternatives. Researchers have evaluated the behavioral
effects of nictotine, alcohol, and opiate by identifying specific units of the relevant
substance such as a defined alcoholic drink (Jacobs & Bickel, 1999; Murphy &
MacKillop, 2006). Often times the amounts have been accepted quantities (one puff of a
cigarette, one alcoholic drink). Does our use of “one spin on a slot machine that can win
up to $10” provide the reinforcement for a gambler? Future directions should take into
account the challenges of conducting gambling research in such a framework and the
special case gambling may present compared to other addictive behaviors.
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Appendix
Table 1
Means and Standard Deviations of Proportion of Presses for Spins on a Slot Machine
Delay condition
Money

No delay

2 weeks

8 weeks

Average M

M

.41

.33

.36

.36

SD

.34

.19

.20

M

.42

.46

.35

SD

.27

.34

.31

.41

.40

.35

condition
5 cents

25 cents

Average M

22

.41

Table 2
Means and Standard Deviations of Arcsine Transformed Proportion of Presses for Spins
on a Slot Machine
Delay condition
Money

No delay

2 weeks

8 weeks

Average M

M

.71

.60

.62

.64

SD

.1

.1

.1

M

.68

.74

.63

SD

.1

.1

.1

.70

.72

.62

condition
5 cents

25 cents

Average M

23

.68

